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Supplementary Figures
Supplementary Figure S1 : Decision screens presented to the participants. (a) PDG in the fixed treatment, (b) PDG in the mixed treatment, (c) PGG in the fixed treatment, and (d) PGG in the mixed treatment. In fact, the screens were displayed in Japanese. Here we translated the text into English.
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Supplementary Figure S3 : The expected probability of C predicted by the reinforcement learning models in the PDG. We predicted the probability of C by running the BM or RE model with the estimated parameter values. Then, we averaged the predicted probability of cooperation over the participants and the rounds, and plotted them as a function of N c (i.e., the number of the other group members that cooperated in the previous round). 
Supplementary Methods
Values of the payoffs used in the experiments
We determined the values of b, c, and m to make the payoff when a player chose C or D in the PDG be identical to that when the player maximally cooperated or maximally defected in the PGG, respectively. Denote by N the number of participants in the group. Denote by K the fraction of players who select C in the case of the PDG and the normalized contribution averaged over the group members in the case of the PGG. Denote by " the action (C = 1, D = 0) by the ith other member in the group (1 < i ≤ N -1) in the case of the PDG and the normalized contribution by the ith other member in the group (0 ≤ " ≤ 1) in the case of the PGG. Then, we obtain = " %&' "(' ( -1).
First, consider the case in which a player maximally cooperates in both the PDG and the PGG. By equating the payoff value given by equation (1) with a t = 1 and that given by equation (2) with a t = 1, we obtain
Second, consider the case in which a player maximally defects in both the PDG and the PGG. By equating equation (1) with a t = 0 and equation (2) with a t = 0, we obtain + ( − 1) = + ( − 1).
By combining equations (S1) and (S2), we obtain = (S3) and 
Directional learning model
In the directional learning model, the stimulus, s t , was defined by equation (5), and equation (7) was modified as follows: 9 = 9-' + 1-9-' 9-' 9-' ≥ 9-= and 9&' ≥ 0 , 9-' + 9-' 9-' 9-' ≥ 9-= and 9&' < 0 , 9-' -9-' 9-' 9-' < 9-= and 9&' ≥ 0 , 9-' -1-9-' 9-' 9-' < 9-= and 9&' < 0 .
